The court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the 1946 contract had established a relationship between the lawyer and the client, and a client who signed a conservation agreement in connection with a controversy can clear the lawyer and make it become a Quanten Meruit action. The Appeal Division asserted, for another reason: that the 1946 agreement, as amended by the conciliation agreement, was indecent and contrary to public policy. One reason was that the defendant was “obliged to pay the complainant what could forever be described as a tribute.” (5) If the claim is subject to the provisions of Section 6146, it should be noted that the rates set in this section are the limits of the contingency tax agreement and that the lawyer and client may negotiate a lower rate. District Judge Branchflower, barnsley County Court, found that the conditional royalty agreement between the training lawyers and the applicant was not applicable because the CFA provided for a success fee, but did not provide these success fees as a percentage. Counsel for the applicant stated that “the district judge was legally incorrect and that his discretion came to the conclusion that the CFA was unenforceable, so that the applicant`s right is limited to the costs of the payments for which he is responsible independently of the CFA.” The first case relied upon by the Ballow Brasted Court to support its ratification theory is Ferguson v. Lion Holding, Inc., 312 F.Supp.2d 484, 498-500 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), a case also cited by the Second Circuit. Ballow Brasted has properly described Ferguson as the fact that “a contract is nullified by fraud” and that “the aggrieved party must not maintain the advantage of the contract while ignoring its commitments there.” If these principles apply to King`s case, the unscrupulous royalty agreement between King and Fox could be applied because King had obtained the benefits of Fox`s legal work in three complaints. But the Ferguson case is of minimal importance because in Ferguson it is not a lawyer`s contract. Ferguson is more of a breach of contract by former executives against an insurance company.

Similarly, the second case, which is the ballow Brasted court to support its ratification theory, Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23, 28 (2d Cir.1994), has nothing to do with legal fees. In other cases in New York as well, there is no question of whether a client can ratify an unscrupulous agreement on legal fees. In the late fall of 1978, when a preliminary agreement had been reached, but prior to its signing, Fox King indicated that, as part of the conservation agreement, Fox would receive one-third of King`s royalties on a permanent basis. King was “shocked and surprised” by the information, but he “put it off” because it is “of the utmost importance” for him to obtain compensation. King asked Fox to send the transaction agreement and the conservation agreement to his wife`s lawyer, John Groon, to verify it. Groon reviewed the agreement and then asked Fox if the conservation agreement indexed royalties to Fox on the basis of future royalties. Fox responded that the conservation agreement covered “all royalties that Ed can make from his involvement in Lynyrd Skynyrd” and asked King to call him (Fox) if he disagreed.

Fox also pointed out to Groon that if King did not sign the agreement with MCA by November 11, 1978, the MCA kings` money would be paid “as a representative of the interests of The City of New York.” King would then be liable for MCA`s legal fees, the settlement money would not earn interest, and it would take “a long time plus a tax in Ed`s name to recover the money from the New York City treasury.” All this was false, but king “panicked.” His wife was about to have a baby, he needed the money money, and he didn`t want to risk liability for MCA`s legal fees or have his settlement money hired at the New York Treasury for years.